The shocks of the past decade — culminating in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — exposed how deeply energy systems are embedded in questions of security, political control and economic competitiveness.
This report analyses how countries along the EU’s Eastern Flank responded to these pressures, why their paths diverged, and what this reveals about the limits and possibilities of resilience in a fractured geopolitical environment.
Introduction
Over the past decade, energy systems across the EU’s eastern flank have undergone profound change. What began as a gradual transition was increasingly shaped by overlapping pressures: rising climate ambitions, volatile markets, growing geopolitical tensions and, ultimately, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Together, these factors reshaped how governments approach energy security, affordability and long-term policy choices.
For the purpose of this report, the EU’s eastern flank refers to nine countries: Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Despite their shared geopolitical position, these states entered the past decade with very different energy systems, policy priorities and levels of preparedness, shaped by legacy infrastructure and domestic political choices.
These differences became particularly visible after 2022, when disruptions to Russian energy supplies exposed uneven resilience across the region. Some countries adapted quickly, drawing on earlier investments in diversification and infrastructure, while others faced rapid and costly adjustments. Rather than producing a single regional response, the crisis revealed a patchwork of national strategies. At the same time, high prices made the energy transition politically harder to manage: government intervention contained immediate social pressure, but also exposed tensions between climate objectives, competitiveness and public support. Regional cooperation proved essential during the crisis, particularly through infrastructure and emergency coordination, yet remained uneven outside such periods.
This report examines how energy systems and policy choices across the EU’s eastern flank evolved under these pressures. It analyses national responses to the energy crisis, approaches to prices and competitiveness, and the limits and potential of regional cooperation within a changing global context.
To support this analysis, the report is accompanied by an infographic comparing national energy systems from two perspectives: installed electricity capacity and electricity production. Installed capacity reflects long-term policy priorities and investment decisions, while electricity production shows how these choices translate into real system outcomes. All data used in the infographic are sourced from Eurostat.
1. Comparing energy mixes and policy priorities over the past decade
Over the past decade, energy systems across the EU’s eastern flank have evolved in markedly different ways. While all countries formally operate within the same EU climate and energy regulatory framework, their energy mixes and policy priorities reveal clear divisions in ambition, pace and strategic direction. Comparing installed electricity capacity and actual electricity production today with their levels a decade ago — supported by an accompanying infographic — highlights not only technological choices, but also deeper political preferences shaping national energy strategies.
A first group of countries stands out for the relative coherence between their energy mixes, climate objectives and long-term policy planning. Finland and Latvia illustrate this model, albeit in different ways. Over the past 15 years, Finland has combined growing investment in renewables and nuclear power with deeper integration into Nordic electricity markets (i.e. electricity transmission connections to Sweden and Estonia).
Latvia followed a renewable-led path rooted in hydropower, complemented by incremental additions of solar capacity and strong reliance on regional market integration. While hydropower has long dominated electricity production, recent growth in solar capacity has helped smooth seasonal variability rather than replace existing sources. As Igors Kasjanovs, Senior Economist at the Nordic Investment Bank, notes, “there is a simple economic logic here. The revenue side of projects has not changed significantly, but the expenditure side has — this is purely technological progress. Solar panels have become cheaper.” This suggests that Latvia’s energy transition has been driven less by short-term geopolitical shocks than by structural cost trends reinforced by EU market integration.
Lithuania broadly fits this group, although it has shifted faster than others. In 2014 its electricity mix was dominated by natural gas, whereas by 2023 solar and wind together accounted for the majority of installed capacity and gas had become a smaller share. The successful synchronisation of the Baltic electricity grids with the Continental European system in 2025 marked the final decoupling from the old Soviet-era network and strengthened their integration into the EU’s internal energy market, enabling more stable market integration, system balancing and long-term planning.
A second group pursued decarbonisation primarily through nuclear power, prioritising system stability and industrial competitiveness over rapid diversification. Slovakia and Czechia fall into this category, but with important differences. Slovakia opted for speed and technical efficiency, rapidly expanding nuclear generation while completing the phase-out of an already marginal coal sector.
Since the 1980s, Slovakia has developed its nuclear energy sector continuously, including major investments in the last decade (with the completion of Mochovce unit 3) which significantly strengthened the role of nuclear power in its electricity mix. As a result, nuclear power accounts for over 60% of electricity production despite a much smaller share in installed capacity.
In Czechia, coal has declined from being the dominant source of installed capacity a decade ago, while solar capacity has expanded significantly, with nuclear power retaining a stable role in the system. Czechia followed a slower and more cautious route, managing coal phase-out through planned timelines and preserving policy predictability for industry.
A third group is shaped primarily by security, affordability and structural constraints, including historical legacies and geographic conditions, rather than by the rapid reconfiguration of energy mixes. Poland and Bulgaria exemplify this pattern. In Poland, coal remained a central stabilising source throughout most of the past decade, even as wind and solar capacity expanded rapidly. As a result, the growing share of weather-dependent generation has increased the need for system balancing and backup capacity, with associated costs linked to maintaining flexibility and ensuring supply security.
Bulgaria followed a slightly different trajectory. Ten years ago, its electricity mix was dominated by coal and nuclear power, with renewables playing a secondary role largely limited to hydropower. By the early 2020s, solar capacity expanded rapidly and the share of low-carbon generation increased substantially, while coal, though reduced, continued to play a significant role. This shift reflects a gradual rebalancing of the mix rather than a full structural break with legacy sources.
Romania occupies a more hybrid position. Its energy mix is unusually diversified, combining hydro, nuclear, gas and renewables. Rather than prioritising a single dominant technology, Romanian policy focused on balancing security, diversification and regional responsibilities, including support for Moldova. Planned gas production in the Black Sea reflects a pragmatic approach that treats domestic resources as a transitional tool rather than a long-term anchor. This diversified structure sets Romania apart from both coal-dependent and nuclear-centric models in the region.
Hungary stands outside these categories. Its energy mix remains strongly shaped by natural gas and nuclear power, while renewable deployment has progressed more unevenly than in many neighbouring countries. Over the past decade, energy policy has prioritised price stability and state control, frequently diverging from market-based and climate-driven approaches promoted at EU level. This stance is reflected in the structure of the energy system, where diversification and decarbonisation have played a secondary role compared with political and social considerations.
Taken together, these contrasting paths show that energy transitions across the EU’s eastern flank have been driven as much by political choices as by accessible technology. Countries with long-term, coherent strategies tend to show parallel trends of expanding renewable installed capacity and rising renewable electricity production, accompanied by declining fossil fuel generation and emissions, even if the relationship between capacity and output is not always linear.
Others continue to prioritise security, price stability or political control, resulting in slower or more fragmented transitions. Despite common EU targets and shared shocks after 2022, energy mixes across the region have converged only partially, and national policy priorities continue to shape both the pace and credibility of the transition..
2. Energy resilience after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the 2022 energy crisis
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine acted as a real-life stress test for energy systems across the EU’s eastern flank. It exposed deep structural vulnerabilities, but also clearly differentiated national approaches to risk. Broadly, three paths emerged: countries that had prepared in advance for a possible cut-off of Russian supplies; those that reacted rapidly but largely only once the crisis hit; and a small group that chose to maintain close energy ties with Russia despite the changing security environment.
Poland was among the countries that entered the 2022 crisis relatively well prepared. Reducing dependence on Russian energy had been a strategic priority for more than a decade. Investments in LNG infrastructure, new gas interconnectors and access to global oil markets through the Naftoport terminal and Poland’s direct access to the sea enabled Warsaw to cut Russian gas and oil imports entirely in 2022. These long-term decisions significantly reduced exposure to physical supply disruptions and limited Moscow’s political leverage during the crisis.
Finland followed a different, but equally decisive path. Before 2022, it was among the more exposed EU countries in terms of reliance on Russian energy imports, including gas, electricity and nuclear fuel, and it did not prioritise early diversification away from Russia. In April 2021 a Finnish consortium, Fennovoima, announced plans to build a Russian-designed nuclear plant at Hanhikivi, despite warnings that Rosatom could be used as political leverage.
The project illustrated how hard it was for Finland to break away from energy ties with Russia after Crimea. When supplies were cut, however, Finland absorbed the shock through strong contingency planning, a decentralised energy system and the limited role of gas in the overall energy mix, combined with rapid access to LNG and deep integration with Nordic electricity markets.
More importantly, the invasion triggered a fundamental political shift. “Previously, Finland pursued a policy of pragmatic engagement with Russia, but this changed with Finland’s accession to NATO and contributed to the emergence of a new political line,” said Szymon Kardaś, expert on international economic law at the University of Warsaw. Energy resilience became a core security objective, leading to a lasting and deliberate break with Russian energy dependence.
In the Baltic region, the invasion reinforced rather than reshaped existing strategies. Lithuania and its neighbours had long treated dependence on Russian energy as a security risk and invested early in diversification and regional solutions. Lithuania, which commissioned an LNG terminal already in the previous decade, completed its decoupling from Russian gas after 2022 and strengthened its role as a regional diversification hub. The country also accelerated renewable deployment and deepened regional electricity integration as part of a broader security-driven transition.
Latvia focused on strengthening regional cooperation, relying on the Inčukalns gas storage facility and deeper electricity market integration, while remaining highly dependent on cross-border interconnectors. This model strengthened resilience by providing access to regional balancing and storage, but also increased exposure to external shocks beyond national control. In the Baltic states more broadly, the crisis validated earlier policy choices and underscored the importance of regional coordination among countries that had long been sceptical of Russia as an energy partner.
Romania and Bulgaria also accelerated diversification mainly after 2022. Romania used the crisis to end Russian oil imports and strengthen its role as a regional stabiliser. Diversified gas routes and the prospect of Black Sea gas production improved both national resilience and regional supply security, particularly for Moldova. At the same time, Romania’s already diversified electricity mix, combining hydro, nuclear, gas and renewables, reduced exposure to single-source shocks and provided additional flexibility during the crisis.
Bulgaria, after losing Russian gas abruptly, diversified rapidly through LNG imports and new interconnectors. However, political instability and delayed reforms weakened the overall effectiveness and coherence of the response. Despite these constraints, Bulgaria’s legacy nuclear capacity and growing solar generation helped cushion the immediate impact of the gas cut-off and supported continued electricity exports to the region.
Czechia illustrates a second approach, reacting decisively but largely in response to the shock itself. The countryentered the crisis with high exposure to Russian gas, supplied mainly via transit routes through neighbouring countries. Once political decisions were taken, however, adaptation was rapid.
The state-owned energy company ČEZ secured regasification capacity at the Dutch LNG terminal in Eemshaven and also booked capacity at the planned German terminal in Stade, expected to become operational in 2027, extending LNG access beyond the duration of the Eemshaven contract. In oil, diversification relied on the expansion of the TAL–IKL pipeline bringing crude from the Italian port of Trieste, enabling the phase-out of Russian supplies via the Druzhba pipeline by 2025.
Gas vulnerability remained visible after 2022, with imports of residual Russian gas resuming indirectly via neighbouring countries and peaking again by the end of 2024; however, the expiry of transit arrangements in 2025 ended these deliveries once more, this time with greater preparedness thanks to diversification.
A third approach stands apart from the broader regional trend. While Hungary has chosen to maintain close energy ties with Russia, Slovakia has only partially reduced its exposure to Russian energy supplies. Slovakia improved electricity resilience thanks to nuclear power and strong interconnections, but remains heavily dependent on imported gas, oil and nuclear fuel.
“Slovakia’s dependence on Russia is not driven solely by geographical constraints, but also by the slow pace of diversification and political choices, particularly in the gas and nuclear sectors,” noted Jakub Wiech, an energy expert and Editor-in-Chief of Energetyka24.com. While Slovakia expanded interconnections and indirect access to LNG, it remains exposed to Russian gas flows via neighbouring countries and has made limited progress on nuclear fuel diversification.
Hungary represents a distinct case within the region. Unlike most eastern-flank countries, it has not moved to reduce core energy dependencies on Russia after 2022. Russian gas and oil remain central to supply, and fuel for the Paks Nuclear Power Plant — which provides over 40% of Hungary’s electricity — also remains Russian. Nuclear power is positioned as the backbone of Hungary’s long-term strategy, and the government continues to insist on building Paks II with Rosatom.
However, despite years of planning and permitting, full-scale construction has not yet begun in a way that delivers new generation capacity, leaving the project’s timeline and contribution to resilience uncertain.
“The 2022 energy crisis exposed the long-term consequences of earlier policy choices. Countries that invested early in diversification, infrastructure and regional cooperation were generally better positioned to absorb the shock when Russian supplies were cut, while others were forced into rapid, reactive adjustments under pressure,” said Szymon Kardaś.
He added “The cases of Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Slovakia show that political decisions remain as important as geography in shaping energy dependence.” Overall, the crisis significantly reduced the EU’s reliance on Russian energy, but also highlighted uneven levels of resilience and emerging constraints on solidarity where national strategies diverged.
3. Policy responses to prices, supply stability and industrial competitiveness
After the 2022 energy crisis, energy policy across the EU’s eastern flank increasingly revolved around three closely linked challenges: price levels, supply stability and industrial competitiveness. While high prices triggered the most immediate political reactions, differences in supply resilience and system structure proved equally important in shaping longer-term economic outcomes. Governments were forced to navigate difficult trade-offs, often under strong social and political pressure, and the choices they made continue to affect investment, industrial performance and public finances.
A key starting point is that much of the immediate post-2022 price intervention across the EU operated within an exceptional and time-limited framework adopted at EU level. This framework allowed Member States to introduce temporary price regulation and compensation mechanisms for final consumers under specific conditions during the crisis period.
While the scope for broad-based price intervention has since narrowed, national measures introduced during the crisis have in many cases been adjusted gradually rather than removed abruptly, reflecting ongoing social and political sensitivities.
A first group of countries benefited from diversified energy systems and high supply reliability, which helped contain price volatility and supported industrial competitiveness without extensive state intervention.
Finland stands out in this respect. Following the initial shock in 2022, electricity prices stabilised relatively quickly, supported by a low-carbon power mix, strong interconnections with neighbouring markets and a high degree of system flexibility. These features reduced exposure to both supply disruptions and extreme price swings.
For industry, predictable access to electricity and relatively stable pricing conditions strengthened Finland’s attractiveness for electricity-intensive sectors, including data centres and advanced manufacturing. At the same time, the Finnish case also highlights limits: periods of low wind and cold weather still lead to short-term price spikes, showing that even well-structured systems remain sensitive to weather variability.
Latvia also benefited from supply stability rooted in regional integration rather than domestic overcapacity. As a small and highly interconnected system, it relied heavily on cross-border electricity trade to balance supply and demand. This approach helped avoid severe disruptions and moderated price volatility, particularly during peak stress periods. Policy responses focused on strengthening market integration rather than introducing broad price controls.
While this limited fiscal costs and market distortions, it left households and smaller businesses more exposed to inflationary pressures. From an industrial perspective, however, access to regional markets and stable supply conditions reduced the risk of sudden disruptions, even if affordability challenges persist.
Lithuania followed a partly similar but more structurally driven path. While also relying on regional market integration, it entered the post-2022 period with a stronger focus on expanding domestic generation capacity, particularly solar and wind. This helped reduce exposure to extreme price volatility compared with systems more dependent on gas-fired generation setting marginal prices. At the same time, Lithuania relied on temporary, crisis-era support measures to protect households from price shocks, while allowing market prices to play a greater role for non-household consumers.
From an industrial perspective, the combination of growing domestic low-carbon generation and deeper integration into regional electricity markets improved supply stability, although investment decisions remain sensitive to grid capacity constraints and the costs of integrating rapidly expanding variable renewables.
A second group of countries faced persistent tension between supply security and price competitiveness, despite avoiding physical shortages. Czechia and Romania illustrate this pattern. In Czechia, emergency diversification measures and EU-level cooperation ensured supply stability after 2022. Although direct reliance on Russian gas ended, the system continued to be indirectly exposed through regional market flows during the transition period.
Household electricity prices remain among the highest in Europe relative to purchasing power, continuing to weigh on consumers and energy-intensive industries. For manufacturing sectors operating in competitive European and global markets, high energy costs remain a structural disadvantage.
More broadly, the crisis showed that price exposure did not depend solely on physical supply disruptions. Even where gas remained available, high gas prices translated directly into elevated wholesale electricity prices through marginal pricing mechanisms, particularly in systems where gas-fired generation frequently set the market price during peak hours. By contrast, electricity systems dominated by nuclear power and other stable low-carbon sources proved less vulnerable to the most extreme price spikes.
Romania faces a comparable challenge. Although supply security improved and reliance on Russian oil ended, final electricity prices remain very high relative to incomes. A significant share of these costs comes not from wholesale prices alone, but from transmission, distribution and tax components embedded in the final bill.
Temporary compensation schemes softened the immediate impact of the crisis, but their gradual withdrawal has reignited social and political pressure. In both countries, stable supply has not automatically translated into competitive end-user prices, highlighting the limits of resilience that is not matched by cost reform.
Poland combines relatively strong supply security with ongoing price challenges rooted in system structure. Long-term diversification efforts reduced exposure to supply disruptions, but continued reliance on coal has kept electricity prices sensitive to fuel availability and broader wholesale market dynamics. During the crisis, EU carbon prices temporarily eased, while the dominant constraints became coal availability and fuel price volatility, alongside gas-driven price formation in regional markets. Government policy relied heavily on price caps and compensation schemes to protect households and industry.
While these measures led to higher fiscal spending, they were designed to mitigate immediate social and industrial pressures in the crisis context and have been scaled down as market conditions stabilised. For industry, uncertainty over future energy costs remains a major constraint on investment decisions, illustrating that supply resilience alone does not guarantee competitiveness.
Slovakia and Bulgaria relied more extensively on state intervention as a tool of social stabilisation, with clearer trade-offs for industry. In Slovakia, regulated gas and heat prices helped contain social tensions, but shifted costs onto the state budget and industrial consumers. Energy-intensive sectors faced higher prices and uncertainty, weakening competitiveness. Progress on nuclear fuel diversification has been slow, although plans are in place to diversify sources of supply over the medium term.
Bulgaria followed a similar path in a context of widespread energy poverty. While subsidies helped protect households, delayed market liberalisation and underinvestment in grids increased system costs over time. At the same time, rapid growth in variable renewables without sufficient flexibility has raised balancing needs and system-management costs, adding pressure to networks and final bills.
Hungary represents a structurally different model. While price caps and subsidies in most countries were introduced mainly as temporary crisis measures, Hungary has relied on administrative price control for households as a central instrument of energy policy for many years. Household prices are deliberately insulated from market fluctuations to preserve short-term social stability, with fiscal mechanisms absorbing part of the cost.
During the crisis, the system was adjusted by introducing consumption thresholds, while most non-household consumers were moved closer to market pricing. This approach reflects a deliberate political strategy that prioritises household price protection over market-based price signals and tends to weaken incentives for energy efficiency and investment, with implications for long-term competitiveness.
Taken together, the post-2022 experience shows that differences in energy outcomes across the EU’s eastern flank are driven less by the scale of intervention and more by how energy systems are structured and governed. Countries that entered the crisis with diversified supply, strong interconnections and flexible markets were better able to absorb shocks without undermining industrial performance. Where such foundations were weaker, governments relied more heavily on administrative tools to contain social pressure, often at the expense of competitiveness.
The contrast between temporary crisis management and more permanent price intervention also proved decisive: while short-term measures helped stabilise societies, prolonged distortion of price signals tended to shift costs onto industry and delay investment. The region’s experience suggests that resilience, affordability and competitiveness are not mutually exclusive goals, but aligning them requires policy choices that go beyond emergency responses and address the underlying functioning of energy systems.
4. Shared challenges and the opportunities and limits of regional cooperation
Although countries across the EU’s eastern flank differ in their energy mixes and policy choices, they are increasingly confronted with the same set of hard constraints. Energy security, high prices, pressure on industrial competitiveness and the need to modernise infrastructure have become shared points of reference, shaping national debates and defining the limits of policy choices across the region. These common challenges create a clear rationale for regional cooperation, even if turning shared problems into coordinated action has often proved difficult.
Energy security and the protection of critical infrastructure have emerged as the most widely shared concern since 2022. The legacy of dependence on Russian fuels, combined with the experience of supply disruptions and growing awareness of physical and cyber threats, has pushed security considerations to the centre of energy policy.
This is particularly visible in the Baltic states, Poland and Finland where safeguarding LNG terminals, pipelines, electricity interconnectors and grids is treated as a strategic priority. Because energy systems are deeply interconnected across borders, this area offers strong potential for cooperation, including joint risk assessments, coordinated investments and shared contingency planning.
High energy prices represent another common challenge, though their implications for cooperation are more complex. Across the region, elevated costs continue to affect households, industry and public finances. While governments have responded in different ways, price pressure itself is a shared constraint that limits political room for manoeuvre.
Rather than leading to coordinated price policies, this challenge has mainly reinforced interest in indirect forms of cooperation, such as improving cross-border electricity trade, strengthening market integration and investing in infrastructure that can reduce costs over time by increasing supply flexibility and competition.
Concerns over industrial competitiveness add another layer to the case for cooperation. .Energy-intensive industries across the eastern flank face similar pressures from high costs, supply uncertainty and regulatory fragmentation. This includes for example pressures on steelmaking and chemical producers in Poland, energy-intensive manufacturing in Bulgaria, and automotive supply chains in Czechia and Slovakia.
At the same time, these challenges increasingly intersect with broader global competition. Both the United States and China are investing heavily in domestic energy systems, clean technologies and industrial policy, creating a more demanding external environment for European industry. Maintaining competitive and predictable energy systems is therefore not only a national concern, but a shared European challenge that ultimately requires coordinated action at EU level.
In principle, the scale and similarity of these challenges argue for stronger regional coordination and a more coherent voice at EU level. In practice, however, cooperation remains uneven and fragile. As Szymon Kardaś notes, “regional cooperation may seem obvious, but in reality it is very difficult to achieve. Even when countries face partly shared challenges, their interests and the ways in which they act often diverge.”
He adds that these differences extend well beyond energy policy to foreign policy priorities, attitudes towards Ukraine and broader views on European integration, significantly limiting the scope for sustained political alignment.
Political fragmentation has also weakened existing regional formats. The Visegrad Group, once seen as a platform for cooperation, has struggled to maintain relevance amid diverging positions on Russia, climate policy and relations with the EU. Jakub Wiech argues that “the Visegrad format clearly shows the core problem of regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe: the lack of leadership, the lack of a shared strategic vision, and the tendency to prioritise short-term national interests over long-term coordination.”
Wiech points to the Polish–Czech dispute over the Turów lignite mine, which has recently resurfaced, as an illustration of this broader pattern. The Turów case exemplifies how bilateral and regional relations are often shaped by narrow national calculations, even when countries face shared challenges. In Wiech’s view, the Visegrad experience demonstrates how this approach repeatedly undermines trust and makes sustained regional cooperation difficult to achieve.
These concerns are reflected not only in regional formats but also in the region’s approach within the European Union. Wiech argues that what is currently missing from regional cooperation — especially in relations with Brussels — is a more constructive stance. “Rejecting climate policy is not a solution, yet this is the line pursued by Hungary and, to some extent, also by Poland,” he says. He stresses that the broader context is changing rapidly: “The world is changing, the rules of the game are changing, and Europe must reduce its dependence on external alliances — not only in terms of energy supplies. This is both a challenge and an opportunity.”
In Wiech’s view, this requires forward-looking, Eurocentric thinking focused not on decades, but on the next few years, including efforts to rebuild Europe’s industrial and productive capacities that have shifted to China and the United States.
Despite these constraints, the experience of the past decade shows that regional cooperation is possible, especially when it is reinforced by strong external impulses. As Dr Szymon Kardaś observes, in recent years the coordination across the region has has instead been driven by two parallel forces. “On the one hand, it was actively initiated and supported by the European Union through instruments such as the Connecting Europe Facility and REPowerEU,” he notes. “On the other hand, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine acted as a powerful external shock that forced countries to cooperate faster and more closely than before.”
A strong example of more successful cooperation can be found in the Baltic States, where countries have made significant strides in integrating their energy markets. Although the region was not fully integrated into the EU energy framework until very recent, joint projects such as the synchronization of electricity grids, cross-border electricity trading and shared LNG infrastructure — including the Klaipėda terminal in Lithuania — have significantly improved regional security and supply resilience.
This cooperation, supported by both national efforts and EU-level instruments, helped reduce dependence on Russian energy and align the Baltic energy systems more closely with the EU internal market.
Romania provides another example of pragmatic regional engagement, increasingly framing domestic diversification and prospective Black Sea gas production as assets with regional relevance. Support for Moldova’s energy security reflects not only solidarity, but also Romania’s broader strategic interest in regional stability and alignment with EU priorities.
Elsewhere, cooperation has often been slower and more contested due to differing national priorities and timelines, but once implemented, it has proven effective. Poland’s gas interconnectors with Lithuania and Slovakia strengthened supply security on both sides of the border, despite lengthy negotiations and differing national priorities during the planning phase.
Szymon Kardaś therefore does not dismiss regional cooperation, but rather qualifies its scope and form. In his view, cooperation is most realistic where it is limited to specific policy areas and clearly defined objectives, rather than pursued as a broad political project encompassing the entire region.
“There are areas where coordination may be both realistic and beneficial, including EU-backed infrastructure modernisation, cross-border energy projects and measures aimed at protecting critical infrastructure,” he says. According to Kardaś, these practical and security-focused fields offer far greater potential for cooperation than political formats that require deep and lasting alignment across countries with diverging priorities.
Overall conclusions
A broader wake-up call for Europe
The 2022 energy crisis showed that resilience was shaped not only by how well countries had prepared in advance, but also by how quickly they were able to respond once the shock materialised. Long-term investment created room for manoeuvre, while rapid adaptation determined outcomes. This experience confirmed that energy security today depends on a combination of structural preparedness and the capacity for swift, coordinated action in a crisis.
At the same time, the crisis exposed the limits of a policy model built on convenience and short-term economic logic. For years, reliance on Russian energy was widely treated as a rational choice, while diversification was postponed as costly and politically difficult, despite repeated warnings from parts of the eastern flank. The shock of 2022 became a broader wake-up call, revealing deeper vulnerabilities not only in energy systems, but also in Europe’s economic and security assumptions.
This reassessment goes beyond energy policy alone. Shifts in US priorities, Russia’s use of energy as a political weapon and the growing economic and technological weight of China point to a fundamentally changed international environment. In this context, energy policy can no longer be separated from questions of competitiveness and broader security. If Europe is to remain a relevant actor, it must rely more on its own capacity and mobilise its internal potential, including that of the EU’s eastern flank. The past decade shows that this potential exists; the decisive challenge now is turning crisis-driven responses into a lasting strategy based on resilience, internal cooperation and reduced external dependence.
A further lesson concerns the foundations of effective alliances. Durable and meaningful cooperation depends on the existence of shared priorities and a common perception of risk. This condition is largely met among the countries of the EU’s eastern flank, which face similar security exposures and strategic vulnerabilities. It is far less evident at the level of the EU as a whole, where national threat perceptions and economic interests increasingly diverge. It is also becoming less automatic in transatlantic relations, as shifting US priorities underline that Europe cannot assume permanent alignment with external partners. This makes internal cohesion, credible burden-sharing and realistic assessments of shared risk ever more central to Europe’s long-term resilience.
Sources
- European Commission – EU policy documents and analytical materials on energy security, diversification, infrastructure development and crisis response, including REPowerEU and the Connecting Europe Facility.
- Eurostat – EU energy statistics on electricity generation, installed capacity and long-term energy trends, used for cross-country comparisons.
- ENTSO-E / ENTSOG – Data and reports on electricity and gas system integration, cross-border interconnections, LNG infrastructure and market coupling.
- National energy regulators, transmission system operators and statistical offices – Country-level data and official information
- Expert analysis and commentary – Igors Kasjanovs (Nordic Investment Bank), Dr Szymon Kardaś (University of Warsaw) and Jakub Wiech (Energetyka24).
