When the European Commission unveiled its European Democracy Shield in the autumn of 2025, the initiative was framed as a long-overdue response to one of the most destabilising forces facing European democracies: disinformation and foreign information manipulation. The package promises stronger coordination, earlier detection of hostile influence operations, and the creation of a new European Centre for Democratic Resilience to support member states on the frontline.
But as Brussels moves to reinforce the Union’s collective defences, developments across the EU’s eastern flank reveal a troubling paradox. In a region exposed to hostile influence and frequently targeted by Russian information operations, several governments are quietly dismantling their own defences, delaying reforms, or actively contributing to the spread of manipulative narratives.
A review of nine countries – Bulgaria, Romania, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland and Czechia – paints a picture of a region moving in divergent directions. While citizens across the eastern flank are alarmed and increasingly aware of the threat, political responses range from genuine resilience-building to institutional neglect and, at times, open sabotage.
A widening trust gap
Public concern about disinformation is remarkably consistent across the region. Eurobarometer data from May 2025 show overwhelming majorities in nearly all countries fearing that elections are being distorted by false or misleading information. In Hungary, 82% of respondents expressed concern that voters base their decisions on disinformation – the highest figure among the countries analysed. Anxiety remains similarly high in Lithuania (75%), Slovakia and Bulgaria (both 74%), followed by Poland (71%), Finland (70%), Latvia (68%) and Romania (65%). Even in Czechia, the least alarmed country in the group, nearly two-thirds of respondents believe disinformation could influence electoral choices.
This fear is not abstract but grounded in daily exposure. In Hungary, more than half of the population encounters disinformation at least weekly, with nearly one in four reporting daily exposure. Slovakia and Latvia show similar patterns, while Finland – a country widely regarded for its media literacy – also reports frequent encounters with manipulative content.
Citizens are also remarkably aligned on solutions. Across the region, respondents consistently identify education, media literacy and independent fact-checking as the most effective tools for countering disinformation. Calls for censorship are rare, the dominant demand is for resilience – the ability to recognise, verify and contextualise information.
Yet while public awareness has risen sharply, confidence in national authorities has not followed the same trajectory.
The data reveal a growing disconnect between public concern and trust in governments’ ability to respond. In several countries, citizens express deep scepticism that their national authorities are capable of handling disinformation effectively.
This trust deficit is most acute in Bulgaria, where a majority of respondents describe combating disinformation as an “impossible task” under current conditions. Only 38% believe national authorities can deal with the problem. In Czechia and Slovakia, more people distrust than trust the state’s capacity to respond. Romania and Hungary show similarly polarised attitudes.
Finland stands out as an exception. Local respondents express the highest level of confidence in national authorities, reflecting stronger institutional credibility even amid political constraints.
A striking secondary pattern emerges when comparing trust in national governments with trust in the EU. In many eastern flank states, citizens are more confident in the EU’s abilities than in their own capitals. In Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia and Czechia and even in Hungary, belief in the EU’s capacity to counter disinformation exceeds confidence in national authorities.
When governments undermine the fight
The most severe cases are found where governments have actively reversed or repurposed counter-disinformation efforts.
In Slovakia, progress made after 2018 – including the establishment of strategic communication units and expert bodies funded through EU projects – unravelled rapidly following the 2023 elections. Robert Fico’s government dismantled or curtailed institutions tasked with countering hybrid threats. Senior officials dismissed experts as “political activists”, allegedly telling people what to think, while political leaders openly spread pro-Russian narratives.
Russian propaganda websites remained accessible in Slovakia as of August 2025, making the country the worst performer in applying EU sanctions against Russian media. At the same time, government figures accused Western allies rather than Moscow of interference, further distorting the threat landscape.
Hungary presents a different, but equally troubling, model. The government has not merely neglected counter-disinformation policies – it has weaponised them. Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party has sought to redefine “fake news” in ways that blur the line between disinformation and independent journalism. Public media and pro-government outlets actively disseminate Russian narratives about Ukraine and the EU, while independent outlets are accused of serving foreign interests.
The creation of the Sovereignty Protection Office and the proposed “transparency bill” were framed as measures against foreign influence, but in practice target civil society and media organisations reliant on foreign – often EU – funding. This inversion has produced a paradox: Eurobarometer survey revealed that Hungary’s population shows one of the highest demands for fact-checking in the region, yet the state actively undermines those providing it.
Retreat by neglect
In other countries, the erosion is quieter but no less consequential.
Romania illustrates how disinformation can flourish in an institutional vacuum. Disinformation surged during the COVID-19 pandemic and reached new heights during the annulled 2024 presidential election. Yet the state response was minimal. The National Defence Strategy for 2025–2030 no longer commits to combating disinformation, citing instead fragmented responsibilities and a lack of methodology. Concrete measures are absent, leaving ministries to issue occasional rebuttals while coordinated campaigns go largely unanswered.
Czechia reflects a similar ambivalence. Despite rising public concern and increasing EU-level engagement, the strategic communication unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was abolished under new leadership. The move continues a pattern of underinvestment, as the previous government was also criticised for failing to prioritise the issue.
Bulgaria, meanwhile, operates without a dedicated national strategy or specialised counter-disinformation unit. Ministries run isolated initiatives, including a “disinfo radar” at the Ministry of Defence, but the country relies heavily on EU frameworks. Public trust remains correspondingly low, reinforcing a sense of institutional fragility.
Struggling to keep pace
Poland and Latvia occupy a middle ground. Political will exists, but structural weaknesses persist.
Poland is among the most targeted countries in the EU, facing hundreds of manipulative campaigns over the past few years. Yet it lacked a coherent national strategy and failed to implement the EU’s Digital Services Act by the deadline, prompting warnings from the European Commission. Current efforts are spread across ministries, though the government has pledged to prioritise disinformation and cybersecurity from 2026 onwards. Public trust remains relatively high compared with elsewhere, suggesting cautious optimism rather than confidence in existing structures.
Latvia took decisive steps early, blocking Kremlin-linked television channels and online platforms and reducing exposure to Russian propaganda. However, counter-disinformation efforts have since become largely project-based, dependent on short-term funding. A critical vulnerability remains unaddressed: most state-funded rebuttals are produced in Latvian, failing to reach Russian-speaking audiences most receptive to Kremlin narratives.
Constraint and cooperation
Even Finland — often cited as a benchmark for resilience — faces internal constraints. While the country hosts the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (EU–NATO Hybrid CoE) and benefits from high media literacy, it lacks a coordinated national information defence strategy. Budget cuts and political caution, particularly within ministries controlled by the Finns Party, have reduced state-led research and analysis. Responsibility increasingly falls on public broadcasters and independent organisations.
Lithuania stands in sharp contrast. The government has treated disinformation as a long-term geopolitical threat and invested heavily in international cooperation. A high-level agreement with the OECD aims to strengthen “institutional and societal resilience,” with Government Chancellor Giedrė Balčytytė stressing that democracies must act collectively to withstand the scale of propaganda generated by Russia’s war against Ukraine.
At home, Lithuania prioritises prevention over reaction. Media literacy is embedded in school curricula and university programmes, complemented by independent initiatives such as Melo detektorius, which plays a central role in monitoring and debunking false narratives. While challenges persist, Lithuania has emerged as one of the region’s more coherent and consistent actors in the information war.
Shield with cracks
The evidence from the eastern flank points to a fundamental mismatch between citizens and their governments. Across the region, people recognise disinformation as a daily reality and a direct threat to democratic choice. They encounter it often, worry about its impact on elections, and call for education and independent verification as the most effective defences.
The vulnerability lies elsewhere. In too many capitals, counter-disinformation has become a political inconvenience, a budgetary afterthought, or a tool to silence critics rather than confront hostile influence. If the gap between public concern and political action continues to widen, Europe risks building a democracy shield with severe cracks.
